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Non-technical Summary
Union membership in Germany has shown remarkable variation during the last two decades. While after the German unification union membership increased considerably, the German trade unions have suffered from a continuous decline since 1992. Union membership was at 13.7 millions in 1991 and it decreased to 10 millions in 1999. Union density, as the ratio of union membership to employed workers, has exhibited cyclic movements since the formation of trade unions in the nineteenth century. However, the present downward sloping trend of union density in most Western countries, which has taken place with short interruptions since the mid-1970s, causes a debate over the future prospects of trade unions in a post-industry economy. In Germany, the recent mergers of industry oriented unions are a response to the radical changes the unions are confronted with.
In order to assess the economic importance of unions and their bargaining power in the relevant industries, it is necessary to know the union density among employees. The officially available information about gross trade union membership is not sufficient in this regard because the numbers on union membership do not distinguish by employment status and industries. In addition, as of 1991 membership information is usually published only for unified Germany. This paper analyzes the determinants of the propensity to join a union and examines the stability of the estimated union membership function over time. Obtaining evidence on the latter, we attempt to shed light on the question to what extent the ongoing decline in union membership can be explained by intertemporal changes in the workplace and firm specific environment, and in socioeconomic variables. We use four waves of the German Socioeconomic Panel in 1985 Panel in , 1989 Panel in , 1993 Panel in , and 1998 to perform a panel analysis of net union membership among employees and we estimate a correlated random effects probit model suggested in Chamberlain (1984) to take proper account of individual specific effects. By using a block bootstrap estimator for the covariance matrix of the first stage estimator, we robustify Chamberlain's estimator.
As an indicator of the importance of unions, we estimate the share of unionized (employed) workers at the industry level by projecting the estimated union membership function based on the IAB employment subsample, a large data set of employees in West Germany.
Our empirical results suggest that at the individual level the propensity to be a union member has not changed considerably over time. Therefore, the aggregate decline in membership is due to composition effects. We also find a strong decline of net union density at the industry level during the 1990's based on the predicted union membership for the IAB employment subsample, i.e. the composition effect is also strongly working within industries. Our results suggest that unions have not become more attractive for the types of workers who traditionally have a low propensity to be a union member and whose share has been increasing continuously over time. In order to stop the decline in aggregate union membership, unions would have to be much more successful in recruiting these types of workers.
Introduction
Union membership in Germany has shown remarkable variation during the last two decades. While after the German unification union membership increased considerably, the German trade unions have suffered from a continuous decline since 1992. Union density, as the ratio of union membership to employed workers, has exhibited cyclic movements since the formation of trade unions in the nineteenth century. However, the present downward sloping trend of union density in most Western countries, which has taken place with short interruptions since the mid-1970s, causes a debate over the future prospects of trade unions in a post-industry economy. In Germany, the recent mergers of industry oriented unions are a response to the radical changes the unions are confronted with. This paper analyzes the determinants of the propensity to join a union and examines the stability of the estimated union membership function over time. Obtaining evidence on the latter, we attempt to shed light on the question to what extent the ongoing decline in union membership can be explained by intertemporal changes in the workplace and firm specific environment, and in socioeconomic variables. In this context, we test the stability of the propensity to join a union or to stay in a union over time. Rigorous tests of stability over time have rarely been implemented in the literature. A recent study for Germany, Schnabel and Wagner (2003) estimates membership equations for different years, however, without testing for the significance of the differences over time.
The decision of a utility-maximizing individual to join a union can be explained as a result of a cost-benefit analysis. The membership decision is determined by monetary and non-monetary advantages and disadvantages. In the German context, monetary benefits of a union membership are relatively low compared to the membership fees. Monetary incentives of a union membership (strike payments) that might exceed the costs of joining a union are mainly restricted to selected industries in several regions ("Pilotbezirke"), where the wage bargaining process typically starts, and strikes sometimes occur.
However, many services provided by unions can be viewed as public goods among employees. Wage settlements bargained at the industry level are usually relevant for all workers independently of their union membership status and closed shops are legally prohibited in Germany. For this reason, a free-riding behavior of workers seems to be rational. In the absence of closed shops and discriminatory wage policy, there must be other non-monetary incentives to join a union (see Goerke and Pannenberg, 1998 , Lorenz and Wagner, 1991 , Schnabel, 1989 , Schnabel and Wagner, 2003 . We are taking into account selective incentives provided by unions as well as firm and industry related information.
Another issue addressed in this paper is the approximation of the actual strength of unions and their bargaining power in the relevant industries. The officially available information about gross trade union membership is not sufficient to measure their importance on the labor market. First, the data published by trade unions usually do not distinguish between employed and non-employed members (Franz, 2003) . Second, those unions which are organized in the German trade union association ("Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund") are present in several sectors of the economy. Third, as of 1991 membership information is usually published only for unified Germany. For these reasons, the available aggregated data cannot provide an appropriate indicator for the actually strength and significance of trade unions for the German labor market. In order to provide such an indicator, we estimate the share of unionized (employed) workers at the industry level by projecting the estimated union membership function based on the IAB employment subsample (IABS), a large data set of employees in West Germany. This paper extends upon the earlier study in Fitzenberger et al. (1999) which conducted a panel analysis of union membership in West Germany based on the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP) for the years 1985, 1989, and 1993 . This study used a GMM-estimator suggested by Avery, Hansen and Hotz (1983) in the empirical work. Here, we use a longer period by including the year 1998 and we are implementing a correlated random effects estimator suggested by Chamberlain (1984) in our empirical analysis. This estimator takes account of a potential individual specific correlation between unobserved individual specific effects and past, present, and future values of the regressors. By using a block bootstrap estimator for the covariance matrix of the first stage estimator, we robustify Chamberlain's estimator. In Fitzenberger et al. (1999) , the older version of the IABS restricts the prediction of the union membership rates to the period until 1990. Here, we use the new version of the IABS that has only recently been made available enabling us to project our estimates up to 1997. Therefore, this study allows for a detailed analysis of the trends in union membership after German unification. Our results indicate, that the propensity to join a union for an employee with given characteristics has not changed significantly over time, but rather the composition of the workforce and the industry structure is mainly responsible for membership losses of German trade unions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the recent trend in gross total union membership in West Germany. The theoretical arguments why individuals join a trade union are discussed in section 3. Section 4 presents the econometric model. The estimation results for the determinants of being member in a trade union based on the German Socioeconomic Panel can be found in section 5. Section 6 uses the estimates put forward in this paper to predict net union density based on the IAB employment subsample. Section 7 concludes. The appendix provides detailed information on the data and the empirical results. Table 1 shows the development of trade union members for the most important central union associations that publish reliable data. Whereas the four unions considered could increase their stock of members between 1960 and 1980 according to the overall increase of employment, the number of union members remains relatively constant in the 1980s. As a result of the German unification the biggest unions could considerably increase the number of their members. After 1991 the DGB suffers from the largest decline in membership. At the end of the 1990s, we observe a stabilization at a low level. 1960  6378  649  450  200  7762  1970  6712  720  461  190  8203  1980  7882  821  494  288  9486  1981  7957  820  499  294  9572  1982  7849  812  501  297  9459  1983  7745  801  497  299  9344  1984  7660  794  497  306  9259  1985  7719  796  500  307 The interpretation of these statistics is quite problematic, because the published in-formation about union members is not very reliable (Schnabel and Pege, 1992 , p.13f, Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft, 1994 . p.8, Schnabel, 1993 . Moreover, unions only publish aggregate data for employed and non-employed members, and the membership information refers to all of Germany since 1991, restricting the comparability of the data before and after German unification.
Trends in union membership in West Germany
In contrast to the absolute number of union members, the union density allows for a more meaningful evaluation of the importance and strength of unions. Throughout this paper we will call the ratio of union members relative to all employees in the unions' sphere of influence as the gross union density (GUD). The GUD can be calculated based on data from official statistics. However, the GUD overestimates the importance of trade unions in the labor market, because the numerator includes individuals who cannot appear in the denominator, for example unemployed people, retired workers, and students. What we are really interested in is an indicator of the importance and strength of unions in the labor market related to active (employed) members. For this reason, the net union density (NUD), which includes exclusively employed members in the numerator, seems to be the more appropriate reference number. Now, the problem in calculating the NUD is caused by the fact that the number of employed union members will not be published. In addition, a single union cannot be assigned unambiguously to the various industries, and sometimes there are several unions active in one industry. Even the assignment of the single union member to an industry is often unknown.
There are only a few studies which attempt to calculate the NUD at the industry level for Germany. Armingeon (1988) calculates the NUD for several industries until 1985. Lorenz and Wagner (1991) attempt to estimate the NUD for 29 manufacturing industries by multiplying the estimated coefficients based on individual data with the means of the corresponding industry variables. However, the authors neglect industry specific fixed effects in their regressions. We take account of these effects and project the resulting estimates for 46 industries from 1985 to 1997 using a comprehensive individual data set.
Determinants of trade union membership
Why do people join a union? In the anglo-american countries, there exist direct economic incentives for workers to become a union member (Bain and Elias, 1985, Fiorito et al., 1986) . In these countries workers may be forced to join a union in order to get or to keep a job (closed shop). In addition, to be a union member often increases expected earnings. For example, for the U.S., Freeman and Medoff (1984) conclude that unionized workers earn significantly more than their non-unionized colleagues. However, direct economic incentives of a union membership are usually irrelevant for workers in Germany. This is the case for several reasons: First, wage settlements are relevant for all workers within a firm that is a member of the employers' association and closed shops are legally prohibited. Second, via the so called coverage extension rule ("Allgemeinverbindlicherklärung"), firms that are not member of the employers' association can also be forced to adopt wage settlements by the government. Third, unions are restricted in discriminating between members and non-members by law ("negative Koalitionsfreiheit" based on article 9(3) of the German constitution). Fourth, employers tend not to discriminate non-unionized workers in order to prevent them from becoming union-members. These theoretical arguments are also empirically supported by Goerke and Pannenberg (1998) , who find for Germany no significant impact of a union membership on earnings.
Nevertheless, there are plausible determinants of union membership. First of all, unions provide some selective incentives. For example, unions take the role of an insurance. They grant strike pay, take the risk of law-suits with the employer, and provide other services like legal advise exclusively for members. However, these incentives do not seem sufficient in explaining the rationale for paying the fairly high membership fees related with union membership. Moreover, influencing the unions' policy is usually not possible for a single union member. This problem was already emphasized as a central theme in Olson's theory of the "Logic of collective choice" (Olson, 1968) . Second, in addition to economic incentives, the social dimension of a membership decision is deemed important. Social custom, reputation benefits, prestige, philosophy of life, and conformity to internalized norms may also be motives for joining a union (Corneo, 1995 , Goerke and Pannenberg, 1998 , Windolf and Haas, 1989 . Under certain circumstances social coerce, in particular in "traditional" unionized industries like miners and steel workers, might be sufficient to move workers into a union. Without discussing these hypotheses in detail, our empirical analysis attempts to consider such non-economic motives of union membership. We use various socioeconomic variables which may be relevant for the importance of selective incentives or indicating social and vocational environment and the individual philosophy of life.
In light of the theoretical discussion of the determinants to join a union, we will shortly discuss the likely impact of several variables used in the empirical analysis in section 5. The various possible determinants of union-membership may be very different among workers. For some individuals, one motive may dominate their decision to join a union, but usually several reasons co-exist. The relevant variables are structured in three categories. First, individual characteristics and attitudes are relevant "intrinsic motives" for the need of protection , the choice of changing the job, and the costs caused by a job change ("exit" option). Second, the costs of establishing a union and providing services for their members depend on the composition of the workforce and firm or sector related conditions. Third, the monetary costs in the form of membership fees, as well as the non-monetary benefits and costs arising from the social environment at the working place, the presence and strength of unions and their acceptance by employers and employees are further important determinants of joining a union. In the following, we differentiate between personal variables (1-6), a mix of individual and working place related variables (7-10) and firm specific conditions (11-12). The empirical analysis investigates the impact of these variables on the individual propensity to be a union member.
1. Age: The mobility of workers and the relationship to their working place may depend on the age of the worker. It is conceivable that elderly workers are tied more strongly to their job due to higher firm specific human capital and have a lower mobility caused by family ties. Union membership may increase job security since factory committee members, which are usually union members, are commonly involved in dismissal decisions. However, a correlation between the age and union membership may be due to cohort effects. Differences in the value orientation between generations may be responsible for different attitudes about unions or the kind of social custom and the pressure to join or to stay in a union.
2. Education: A higher skill-level is usually connected with a higher professional position and a closer relationship to management. On the one hand, the resulting higher individual labor performance also decreases the need of protection. On the other hand, higher education may be positively correlated with workplace related involvement of the worker and an increasing need of consultation and participation.
In addition, higher wages are -as well as a higher education -usually linked with a more superior position in the firm and a higher responsibility decreasing the probability of a union membership. However, higher wages are also an indicator of firm specific human capital, increasing the costs of loosing or changing the job. We expect a hump shaped relationship between wages and union membership. The effect should be positive for low wages and negative for higher wages.
8. Employee status: Unions traditionally emerged as organizations of blue collar workers. The relatively homogeneous preferences of blue-collar workers also makes is easier to organize them (see Hirsch/Addison, 1986, p.59) . White collar workers are assumed to be closer to their employer. However, a higher expected desire for information and participation at the workplace may increase the activity of white collar workers in unions. There are also differences of expected union density with regard to working time, since the part-time working employees exhibit less attachment to the labor market. It is also more difficult to organize them.
9. Job Satisfaction: Dissatisfied workers often seek support by the union. If the employee recoils to debate with the employer, the work council responsible for workplace related issues and its members are often themselves union members. In addition, the probability of demanding legal advise or financial support in the case of a law-suit with the employer is higher for workers who are unhappy with their working conditions. In addition to their "exit" option, employees can opt for "voice" via union membership. If the union manages to support their members and adequately increase their satisfaction, the opposite effect of a positive correlation between union membership and workers satisfaction is possible. The theoretical prediction of the sign of the effect is ambiguous.
10. Tenure: The connection to the workplace probably increases with the time of employment in the firm. On the one hand, a longer employment duration also strengthens the identification with the job and the loyalty towards the employer, thus decreasing the probability of joining a union. On the other hand, unions already had more opportunities to recruit the employee for their organization. Overall, the sign of the impact of tenure is also ambiguous.
11. Firm size: Due to fix costs, average organizational costs decrease whit firm size. The opportunity for a "voice" option is also negatively correlated with the firm size. Larger companies often have a Work Council or Supervisory Board, both which benefit the activities and the acceptance of unions. The larger the firm the higher are the opportunities of rent-sharing between firms and unions in the goods markets and the greater the extent of wage bargaining in the labor market. For all these reasons, union activities and union density should be positively correlated with firm size.
12. Industry: Unions are traditionally strong in the manufacturing industry. In the public service, unions are accepted by employers, especially where the Social Democrats are in office. In the growing private service sector, the establishment of unions is more difficult due to more rapid changes in the industry, less homogeneous interests of the employees, and a higher opposition of employers. The competition in goods and labor markets also varies over industries and more competition limits the possibility for rent sharing between firms and workers. Moreover, capital accumulation differs considerably between industries. A higher capital intensity causes a lower labor elasticity increasing the scope of union bargaining and union density. In addition, strong unions might give rise to a more capital intensive production.
Correlated Random Effects Probit Model
This section presents the econometric framework that we use in the empirical analysis.
The goal is to estimate the probability of being a trade union member for employed workers. In order to take account of the panel structure of the data and to consider unobserved individual specific effects which might be correlated with the regressors, we estimate a correlated random effects probit model suggested by Chamberlain (1984) . In the previous section, we discussed various variables as potential determinants of union membership. A number of these variables are likely to be correlated with unobserved individual characteristics thus suggesting the estimation of a random effects model allowing for such correlation. While it is beyond the scope of the analysis to explicitly model all endogeneous variables in the absence of a sufficient number of instruments, our approach takes account of the potential endogeneity of explanatory variables in a flexible way.
Consider the following multivariate probit model for individuals i = 1, ..., N in periods t = 1, ..., T :
is multivariate normal with mean 0 and covariance matrix Σ = (σ jk ), {j, k = 1, . . . , T }. We observe (x i1 , ..., x iT , y i1 , ..., y iT ) for a large number of individuals, whereas c i is not observable. The individual specific (fixed) effect c i can be interpreted as individual characteristics such as motivation or attidudes towards life. It is assumed that these characteristics are correlated with past experience and future expectations and that they are stable at least over the sample period.
Based upon the distributional assumptions concerning the residuals (u i1 , ..., u iT ), we obtain the following probit model:
where Φ(.) is the standard normal distribution function and σ tt is the t th diagonal element of Σ.
Because our panel consists of T = 4 years, there exists an incidental parameter problem if we want to estimate all the c i . Therefore, we consider a correlated random effects estimator suggested by Chamberlain, which is based on the following linear specification for the distribution of c i conditional on x i : (3) implies a strong restriction, since the regression function E(c i |x i1 , ..., x i4 ) is linear and we assume homoskedastic and normally distributed error terms. The resulting distribution for y it conditional on x i1 , . . . , x i4 has a probit form:
. Combining the 4 equations yields the following matrix of coefficients:
where ι = (1, 1, 1, 1) , λ = (λ 1 , λ 2 , λ 3 , λ 4 ) , and α = (α 1 , α 2 , α 3 , α 4 ) .
For the period-by-period probit regression of y it on the set of regressors in all periods, we have
Note that only time-varying regressors can be introduced as regressors for each period. The first step of the estimation procedure suggested by Chamberlain (1984) consists of estimating these period-by-period probit equations. Also note that with a sufficient number of time-varying regressors, it is possible to estimate the model with timevarying β coefficients.
The structural parameters β, α, and λ are then estimated in a second stage by a minimum-distance approach since the first stage π-parameters are functions of these structural parameters. As usual in a probit model, it is not possible to identify all scale parameters (α 1 , α 2 , α 3 , α 4 ). However, the ratios αt α 1 , which satisfy the following nonlinear restrictions :
are identified, if β + λ 1 + λ t = 0. We use the scale normalization α 1 ≡ 1 in order to identify the parameters of interest.
The second stage of the minimum distance approach involves the minimization of
with respect to β, α, and λ, where α 1 is set equal to one, vec(Π) is the vector of all elements in the estimated matrixΠ = (π j,k ), {j, k = 1, . . . , 4}, and f (β, α, λ) represents the corresponding vector of the elements of the matrix in equation (5). The weighting matrix W is the variance-covariance-matrix of vec(Π) estimated in the first step.
As an innovation, we use a design-matrix bootstrap procedure in the first stage where we resample the entire observation vector for an individual. We then estimate crosssectional probits for each year based on the resample. If at least one of the 4 nonlinear cross-sectional regressions do not converge we draw another resample and restart the regressions. Overall, we use 1000 valid resamples to construct a robust covariance matrix. We use this bootstrap procedure for the following reasons. First, the bootstrap is likely to provide a better estimate in finite samples since the conventional estimate is based on an asymptotic approximation for a nonlinear estimator. Second, by drawing the entire observation vector for a given individual when forming the resample, the estimated variance-covariance-matrix takes account of remaining individual specific autocorrelation in the error term. Note that such autocorrelation does not invalidate the consistency of the cross-sectional probit estimates or of the entire estimation approach. Third, by basing the resample estimates for all four cross-sections we can automatically estimate the potential covariance between the π-estimates for different periods.
Empirical Results
We estimate the probability of a union membership based on data from the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP) for the years 1985, 1989, 1993, and 1998 . The goal of the analysis is to investigate the stability over time. The data set and the variables used are described in detail in the appendix A. We construct an unbalanced panel of 6623 individuals. The composition of the sample is shown in tables 2 and 3. We estimate a correlated random effects probit model as presented in section 4. This estimator enables us to make use of the panel structure of the data and to take into account unobserved individual specific effects which might be correlated with the regressors. This way, we identify the components of an unobserved individual fixed effect, which can be interpreted as a "long term" characteristic of the individual and "short term" impacts (λ's) of this fixed characteristic. Correlations between the cross-section estimates are considered explicitly by including also past and future values of time varying regressors. The variance-covariance matrix including the covariances between all coefficients in all years is obtained through a bootstrap procedure. Before analyzing the stability of the membership equation over time, we investigate which regressor variables are related to the individual specific effect, i.e. for which variables we find significant λ coefficients.
Applying a series of Wald tests of the hypothesis that the estimated λ's are jointly equal to zero suggests the following assessment of the variables used (here and in the following, we use a significance level of 5 %).
1. Variables unrelated to the individual specific effect: FEMALE, FOREIGNER, AGE, MARRIED, APPRENTICESHIP, ABITUR, UNI-VERSITY, SEMI-SKILLED and SKILLED BLUE-COLLAR WORKER, WORK-ING PART-TIME, CHRISTIAN-DEMOCRAT, SATISFACTION, and industry dummies.
Variables related to the individual specific effect: EARNINGS, SOCIAL-DEMOCRAT, WHITE-COLLAR WORKER, CIVIL SER-VANT, TENURE, and FIRM SIZE.
The results of the Wald tests are not reported here but are available on request. Note that the first group comprises also all time invariant regressor variables for which λ's cannot be estimated.
In order to characterize the changes over time, it is important to examine to what extent the variation in union membership is caused by changes in its determinants or by changes in the impacts of these determinants on union membership. In principle, there are two possibilities of time varying coefficients for a time variant regressor. First, the relationship with the individual specific effect can vary over time (λ's) as mentioned in the previous paragraph. Second, the direct impact of a ceteris paribus change of the regressor for a given individual (β's) can change over time. When investigating as to whether the propensity to be a union member is stable over time for an individual with given observed characteristics and given individual specific effect, we have to analyze the second possibility, i.e. to test for the stability of the β-coefficients over time. For all regressor variables displaying no significant variation of their year specific coefficients β we restrict the coefficient to be equal over time. In contrast to Fitzenberger et al. (1999) , who found no statistical evidence for a variation of the estimated coefficients over time, our results indicate a small number of significant changes of coefficients across the considered years. We present results for three specifications of the union membership equation where specification 1 uses only personal characteristics as regressors, specification 2 involves those regressors available in the IABS data (i.e. the prediction of the net union density NUD for the IABS is based on this specification), and specification 3 uses all available personal and firm characteristics as regressors, see section 3.
The set of regressors for the three specifications are the following (see tables 2 and 3 for the variable definitions):
• The problem of endogeneity should not be very serious in our regressions. As already mentioned, a causal effect of union membership on earnings is hardly conceivable in Germany. Political orientation and satisfaction with work might be endogenous to some degree. These variables are excluded in our specification 2 used for the prediction of union density at the industry level based on the IABS. Furthermore, specification 2 is driven by the fact that the IABS only contains information if an employee is a whitecollar worker or a blue-collar worker or if (s)he is part-time working. Since it is not possible to identify a part-time working white-collar worker or blue-collar worker the employee status variables in specification 2 correspond to this information.
We start with the interpretation of the results for specification 1 involving the individual's characteristics as determinants of union membership. A lower probability of a union membership for females and part-time workers corresponds to the theoretical expectations, see section 3. The negative sign of FOREIGNER seems to strengthen the conjecture that foreigners are less tied to the German labor market. The signs of the age variables indicate a concave impact of the age with a maximum at about 50 years. The education variables ABITUR and UNIVERSITY show the expected negative, but mostly insignificant, impact, whereas an APPRENTICESHIP is positively, but also often not significantly, correlated with the probability of being a union member. Not surprisingly, preferences for the social-democratic party are positively correlated with union membership, whereas an orientation towards the christian-democratic party exhibits a negative, but insignificant sign.
Only for semi-skilled blue-collar workers in specification 1 and 2, we find the expected positive impact and for part-time workers the expected negative sign in all specifications. However, the empirical results indicate no clear significant relationship between being a blue-collar worker (interacted with skill level) and union membership. Some significant changes over time appear quite erratic and are difficult to interpret. Satisfaction with the job seems to be negatively correlated with the propensity to join a union, but only in specification 3 this relationship is highly significant. For gross earnings, we can not find any systematic impact. The other variables, which are also possible determinants of earnings, already seem to affect union membership decision. Firm size exhibits a significantly positive effect on union membership and, notably, the coefficients change significantly over time. These changes are not monotone but if anything then union membership in large firms seems to increase over time.
Summing up, we do not find significant and consistent changes in the β-coefficients over time which can explain the decline in union membership. If anything, the reported changes tend to go into the opposite direction.
Prediction of net union density based on IABS
For the purpose of predicting net union density (NUD) at the industry level, specification 2 discussed in the previous section includes only such variables that are also available in the IAB employment sample (IABS). Based on specification 2, we predict the individual probability of being a union member using about 3.1 million observations during the period 1985-1997 available in the IABS. Because of the quite good statistical fit of specification 2, the prediction here should be more accurate than the prediction in Fitzenberger et al. (1999) for an earlier time period. Lorenz and Wagner (1991) also predicted their empirical results based on the GSOEP data from 1985 for 29 industries using the corresponding average aggregate values at the industry level. In contrast, we are able to provide estimates for a longer period from 1985-1997 determining also the trend in NUD. In addition, our prediction is based on individual data capturing the distribution of characteristics within an industry in a better way. The estimated year specific β-coefficients can directly be used for the years 1985, 1989, and 1993. For the remaining years the coefficients in the two nearest years, for which estimation took place, are linearly interpolated. The prediction uses the available information in the IABS data to construct the individual specific effect. The correspondence between the industry information available in the IABS and the industry classification of the GSOEP can be found in table 9.
After predicting the estimates for the individuals available in the IABS, we regressed the probability of being a union member on industry dummies for each year from 1985-1997. These regressions are computed as weighted OLS, where the single individual observation is weighted by the duration of employment in the corresponding year. Table  8 provides the estimated NUDs for 46 industries which are the dummy coefficients of the aforementioned regression.
Our results show that the estimated NUDs are fairly constant between 1985 and 1989. In most industries, the NUD is decreasing continuously between 1989 and 1997. In all industries the NUD is lower in 1997 than in 1985 (and in 1989) . On average over the years considered, the NUD varies between 18.3 % in sector 34 (Music Instruments, Toys, Fountain Pens) and 57.8 % in sector 21 (Iron) in the manufacturing sector. In most of the non-manufacturing sectors, the NUDs are considerably lower on average with values between 9.6 % in sector 66 (Health and Veterinary) and 25.9 % in sector 55 (Ship Traffic, Waterways).
Conclusion
This paper analyzes union membership among employees in West Germany based on the German Socioeconomic Panel in the years 1985, 1989, 1993, and 1998 . We estimate a correlated random effects probit model as suggested by Chamberlain (1984) to take proper account of individual specific effect. One specification of the estimated models is used to predict union density at the industry level based on the IAB employment subsample (IABS). Our results suggest that at the individual level the propensity to be a union member has not changed considerably over time. Therefore, the aggregate decline in membership is due to composition effects. We also find a strong decline of net union density at the industry level during the 1990's based on the predicted union membership for the IABS data, i.e. the composition effect is also strongly working within industries. Our results suggest that unions have not become more attractive for the types of workers who traditionally have a low propensity to be a union member and whose share has been increasing continuously over time. In order to stop the decline in aggregate union membership, unions would have to be much more successful in recruiting these types of workers.
A Data
Our analysis is based on the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP), a representative random sample of German households, which covers the years 1984-1998. In the initial random sample of households in 1984, foreign households in Germany were oversampled. Among other things, household members aged 16 or older are interviewed regarding demographic issues related to the interview year and questions concerning their working life and their value orientation. In addition to the basic questions each interview contains additional issues, ascertained not every year. Only in 1985 Only in , 1989 Only in , 1993 Only in , and 1998 , one of these issues was membership in a trade union. Consequently, the empirical analysis is restricted to these years. We consider persons in gainful employment only, because our analysis is focusing on the determinants of union membership decision among employees and the determination of the share of unionized workers at the industry level (NUD). For comparability over time, only West Germans are included in the empirical analysis. The resulting sample consists of 6623 individuals for whom the relevant information is available at least for one of the four mentioned years. Over the different years, the number of observations varies between 3271 in 1998 and 4265 in 1989.
The remarkable decline of the share of union members and foreigners in 1998 may at least partly be caused by the high panel mortality in this year. During the period of observation the education level increases considerably. Whereas the average age of the participants in the SOEP is somewhat higher at the end of the period observed, workers' satisfaction is slightly decreasing over time. The earnings variable is defined as gross earnings in the last month in thousands of DM in prices of 1985. As can be seen in table 9 the 35 industries reported in the SOEP are grouped into the 17 industries used in the empirical analysis.
The IAB employment subsample (IABS ≡ "IAB-Beschäftigtenstichprobe") is a 1% random sample from German social security accounts. The new release of the IABS covering the years 1975-1997 has only recently been made available by the research institute of the Federal Employment Service ("Institut für Arbeitsmarkt-und Berufsforschung") in Nürnberg. In contrast to common survey data, the information contained in the IABS is highly reliable because the data are collected to calculate the pensions of retired people. The main features of the data set and a users' guide can be found in Bender et al. (1996) .
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Social security contributions are mandatory for employees who earn more than a minimum wage threshold ("geringfügige Beschäftigung") and who are working regularly. The main exceptions are governmental civil servants ("Beamte") and self-employed, who do not pay any social security contributions. Students who work less than 20 hours a week on a regular basis or less than 6 weeks full-time are also excluded from the mandatory contributions. About 80% of the German employees are covered by this mandatory pension system. The basic information in the IABS consists of social security insurance spells comprising the starting point and the end of an employment spell, the average daily gross wage (excluding employers' contributions) and socioeconomic characteristics. To obtain monthly earnings, the daily wage is multiplied by 30. For our prediction, an annual wage observation is calculated as the weighted average of the wage observations for the individual across all spells in the same industry within one year where the spell length is used as the weight. With multiple spells (jobs) at the same time, cf. Bender et al. (1996, p.74) , we take the sum of the daily wages across spells as the wage observation and treat the individual as full-employed. If an individual was employed in different industries within one year, the spells are grouped by industry. This means that several observations for the same person within a year are possible. The annual wage observations are then weighted by the total employment spell length as percentage of the whole year. High-skilled workers (with a technical college or university degree) are dropped from the data set, because wages above the upper social security threshold ("Beitragsbemessungsgrenze") are not reported reliably. The resulting sample consists of about 3.1 million observations during the period 1985-1997. , , mark significant coefficients to the 10%, 5%, 1% level; standard errors in parentheses. a : If a coefficient is restricted to be constant over time there is no year information. In addition, all specification include year specific dummy variables for missing values in the earnings and the satisfaction (only specification 1 and 3) variables. No. Description 1985 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1996 1997 Precision and Optical .226 .213 .205 .195 .190 .190 .194 .195 .199 .276 .243 .212 .183 Instruments 33 Iron, Sheet Metal and .255 .244 .235 .226 .216 .216 .215 .220 .229 .317 .282 .250 .218 Metal Products 34 Music Instruments, .192 .181 .177 .172 .162 .158 .159 .168 .173 .252 .223 .194 .164 Toys, Fountain Pens 35 Woodwork .338 .336 .336 .333 .331 .322 .314 .310 .305 .306 .294 .285 .275 36 Wood Processing .338 .336 .336 .333 .332 .322 .314 .310 .305 .306 .294 .285 .275 37 Pulp, Paper and Board .417 .412 .406 .408 .408 .394 .381 .379 .378 .378 .365 .356 .342 38 Paper and Products .417 .412 .405 .408 .408 .394 .381 .379 .378 .378 .365 .355 .342 39 Printing and .349 .344 .342 .339 .337 .325 .317 .312 .310 .314 .304 .295 .283 Publishing 40 Leather .313 .311 .312 .314 .312 .305 .296 .290 .284 .274 .259 .247 .231 41 Textiles .364 .362 .365 .368 .368 .356 .346 .343 .339 .331 .315 .301 .286 42 Apparel .285 .283 .282 .285 .285 .280 .274 .271 .268 .271 .254 .233 .217 43 Food .219 .216 .214 .212 .214 .208 .202 .200 .198 .195 .184 .176 .164 44 Beverages .306 .298 .296 .296 .293 .288 .282 .280 .275 .280 .265 .251 .242 45 Tobacco .299 .298 .301 .297 .295 .285 .284 .281 .278 .268 .259 .255 .264 46 Construction .200 .198 .197 .197 .196 .189 .183 .179 .174 .174 .165 .156 .148 50 Trade .143 .138 .135 .133 .129 .127 .126 .125 .123 .125 .118 .110 .102 54 Railways .772 .769 .765 .765 .764 .762 .749 .740 .738 .656 .672 .641 .660 55 Ship Traffic, .272 .270 .264 .275 .278 .267 .265 .263 .262 .247 .241 .239 .219 Waterways 56 German Postal .702 .694 .689 .683 .669 .669 .659 .661 .659 .570 .571 .554 .566 continued on next page...
